Video and official findings
This article summarizes 9arm’s “Boeing Story” video, published in 2024, and checks its technical explanations against the FAA and JATR reports cited here. The door-plug incident on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 is separate from the MCAS-related 737 MAX crashes; it is summarized using the NTSB’s 2025 report.
“Engineering First” and “Profit First” are the speaker’s analytical frameworks, not official findings that either factor alone caused the crashes. FAA, JATR, and NTSB documents are used only to support findings and time periods covered by those documents.
This article compares aviation history with findings covered by FAA, JATR and NTSB documents. It is not current guidance about flight safety or an aircraft’s airworthiness.
The 9arm video tells Boeing’s story through the “Engineering First” and “Profit First” frameworks, connecting them to 737 MAX design, MCAS, aircraft certification, and manufacturing quality issues. This article preserves those views as the speaker’s analysis and presents FAA, JATR, and NTSB findings separately.
“Engineering First” and “Profit First” are the speaker’s frameworks
In the video, the speaker points to changes in corporate culture, the merger with McDonnell Douglas, competition with Airbus, and outsourcing as part of an explanation for cost pressures. This is 9arm’s interpretation, not an official conclusion that the merger or profit targets alone caused any 737 MAX crash.
A safety review needs to consider design, system operation, software, pilot training, maintenance, and oversight together. The FAA’s 737 MAX review discusses these issues collectively; it does not explain the crashes by citing “profit” as the sole cause. the FAA’s 737 MAX review.
MCAS and the 737 MAX: issues identified by the FAA
MCAS is a flight-control system. AOA, or angle of attack, is data that sensors send to flight-control systems. The FAA states that the original MCAS design used data from one AOA sensor at a time. Erroneously high AOA data could trigger MCAS to repeatedly command the horizontal stabilizer to pitch the nose down. The FAA review describes aircraft, crew-system, and maintenance issues that needed to be addressed after Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
Changes reviewed by the FAA updated the software to use data from both AOA sensors, detect differences between their readings, and limit MCAS to one nose-down command for each detected high-AOA event. The FAA’s 737 MAX review describes the changes and the evaluation before the aircraft returned to service in the United States, within the report’s stated time frame.
The FAA’s role and delegated certification work
The 2019 JATR report says the FAA delegated some certification functions to Boeing under the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, while the FAA retained oversight. JATR raised concerns that the FAA did not have sufficient understanding of MCAS and had limited involvement in some areas, which may have prevented an adequate independent assessment of Boeing’s certification work. The report also discusses signs of pressure on members of Boeing’s ODA unit.
According to the FAA’s current description of ODA, authorized organizations may perform certain functions on the FAA’s behalf, with FAA engineers and inspectors providing oversight. Delegation therefore does not mean that the FAA hired Boeing to perform every function or transferred all certification responsibility to the company. For details and findings, see the Joint Authorities Technical Review report.
The 737-9 MAX door-plug incident and 787 issues are separate from MCAS
The video discusses the 737-9 MAX door-plug incident and also raises 787 manufacturing-quality concerns. The 2024 Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 door-plug incident was a different event involving a different system from the MCAS-related 737 MAX crashes.
In a 2025 news release, the NTSB said key contributing factors in the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 incident included insufficient training, guidance, and oversight of Boeing factory employees. An inspection found missing door-plug attachment bolts and incomplete records of the opening and closing work done for repairs, so the required quality inspection was not performed. This information does not support concluding that outsourcing alone caused the event. See the NTSB’s findings.
The 787 is a separate manufacturing-quality issue. The FAA said in September 2025 that it had stopped Boeing from issuing 787 airworthiness certificates in 2022 because of manufacturing-quality concerns, before allowing some certification work to be delegated again under direct FAA oversight. This is context published after the video, not evidence that the 787 issue had the same cause as the MCAS events.
How to read the video alongside official findings
- The video presents 9arm’s analysis of cost pressures and changes in corporate culture. These points should be identified as the speaker’s views.
- FAA and JATR documents describe MCAS, certification, and oversight issues in detail. Use these documents when explaining technical findings.
- The MCAS events, the 737-9 MAX door-plug incident, and 787 manufacturing-quality concerns are separate issues and should not be combined into one cause.
Continue reading about the investigation into engineering failures in the NTSB report on the Titan submersible investigation.